

INFRATRACK

Eastern Mediterranean

Infrastructure & Energy Corridor Brief

SAMPLE EDITION — structure and live data, issued for evaluation

Issued 2026-09-02 · curated statuses re-verified at issuance · scoring s2p-0.1.0

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1. Executive summary

- The East-Med electricity bridge became investable this month: France's Meridiam took majority ownership of the Great Sea Interconnector (Aug 2026), with Nexans contracted to accelerate seabed surveys — while Türkiye's maritime objections keep completion beyond 2029–30.
- Egypt is positioning as Europe's next power supplier: GREGY (3 GW to Greece) holds EU seabed-mapping funds and targets FID in H2 2026, backed by €690m of Egyptian grid upgrades.
- The corridor's logistics spine remains stressed: the July 2026 Red Sea blockade cut Bab el-Mandeb transits ~25%; Suez volumes have stabilized but stay subdued, repricing every East-Med port and LNG assumption.
- Asset base at a glance: 24 major ports, 30 LNG terminals, 53.2 GW operating generation, and 4 electricity interconnectors (6,000 MW built or planned) inside the corridor window.
- Net read: infrastructure momentum is real and increasingly French/EU-underwritten, but every corridor thesis must price two persistent frictions — Türkiye-adjacent maritime risk and Red Sea flow instability.

2. The corridor at a glance

Scope: Greece–Cyprus–Egypt–Levant window (19–36°E, 30–41.5°N), from InfraTrack's live asset layers.

Indicator	Value
Major ports (large + medium, World Port Index)	24
LNG terminals (all statuses, GEM)	30
Electricity interconnectors (built + planned)	4 — 6,000 MW
Maritime chokepoints tracked	2
Operating generation capacity	53.2 GW
Subsea sabotage incidents inside window	0




Figure 1 — Corridor infrastructure overview, rendered from InfraTrack live data

3. The electricity bridge

Four subsea HVDC projects define the corridor’s power story — one operating, one under construction, two competing for the Egypt export lane:

Link	Route	Status	Latest development
Great Sea Interconnector	Greece–Cyprus	Under construction · 1,000 MW	HVDC subsea link (898 km, deepest-laid power cable planned, €1.9bn, €657m EU CEF) connecting Crete to Cyprus, ending Cyprus’s status as the last non-interconnected EU member grid; phase 2 aims at Israel. Aug 2026: France’s Meridiam became majority shareholder of the project company (ADMIE retains a strategic role) and Nexans was signed to accelerate seabed surveys — but Türkiye’s maritime objections and financing friction have pushed completion beyond the 2029–30 target.
Crete–Attica Interconnection	Greece (mainland–Crete)	Operating · 1,000 MW	HVDC link between Attica and Crete, commissioned 2024 — the proving

Link	Route	Status	Latest development
			segment for the wider Greece–Cyprus corridor and the backbone that lets Crete absorb mainland renewables.
GREGY Interconnector	Egypt–Greece	Planned · 3,000 MW	Proposed ~950 km, 3,000 MW subsea HVDC link (ELICA/Copelouzos with ADMIE and Egypt’s EETC) exporting Egyptian renewables to Greece and the EU market. Momentum through 2026: €9.6m EU CEF seabed-mapping funds (Jan), route/cost study tenders under evaluation, FID targeted H2 2026, operation early 2030s; Egypt is laying grid-upgrade groundwork (€690m) for exports.
EuroAfrica Interconnector	Egypt–Cyprus	Planned · 1,000 MW	Proposed HVDC link between the Egyptian grid and Cyprus (2 GW planned, ~1,400 km full route), complementary/competing with the Great Sea corridor southward leg. Still in planning as of Aug 2026: first-stage completion pushed from 2023 to ~2029, with renewed feasibility work after Egypt’s currency crisis.

Statuses verified against live reporting on 2026-09-02. Per-project sources in the appendix.

4. Chokepoints & flow risk

Suez Canal

The corridor’s defining maritime chokepoint: ~12–15% of global trade and a major share of Europe-bound LNG and container traffic. Red Sea security shocks (2023–) rerouted volumes around the Cape; a renewed Houthi blockade against Saudi-linked shipping in July 2026 cut Bab el-Mandeb transits ~25% — canal traffic has stabilized but remains subdued, with VLCCs lightening loads and the Sumed pipeline absorbing flows.

Turkish Straits (Bosporus & Dardanelles)

Black Sea grain, crude and product flows compress through two narrow straits governed by the Montreux Convention — the corridor’s northern valve and a standing geopolitical pressure point.




Figure 2 — Chokepoints and the electricity bridge

5. What to watch — next two quarters

- Great Sea Interconnector under Meridiam: survey completion pace and whether the Cyprus–Israel leg re-enters scope.
- GREGY final investment decision (targeted H2 2026) — the corridor’s biggest single go/no-go signal.
- EuroAfrica financing: whether Egypt’s macro stabilization revives the Cyprus leg or GREGY absorbs the lane.
- Red Sea blockade trajectory: Bab el-Mandeb transit counts and Suez draught-restriction workarounds (VLCC lightening, Sumed flows).
- [Client-specific watch items are added here on issuance.]

6. Methodology & sources

Every InfraTrack dataset passes a source-registry gate recording license, commercial-use rights and review dates before it can appear in the product or a deliverable. Full methodology: infratrack.pages.dev/methodology/

Source	Covers	License
Global Energy Monitor	Pipelines, LNG, power plants	CC BY 4.0
US NGA World Port Index	Ports	Public domain
WRI Aqueduct 4.0	Water stress	CC BY 4.0
World Bank Open Data	Grid indicators	CC BY 4.0
OpenStreetMap (Overpass)	Data centers	ODbL 1.0
InfraTrack research compilation	Corridor projects, chokepoints, opposition & incident events	Own compilation; per-item source links

Data: Global Energy Monitor (CC BY 4.0) · Ports: World Port Index (US NGA) · Water risk: WRI Aqueduct 4.0 (CC BY 4.0) · Grid indicators: World Bank Open Data (CC BY 4.0) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL)

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